solvency norms. 2 Subjecting them to excessive regulation would stifle their ability to implement optimal investment strategies, thereby compromising returns for investors as well as hindering the flow of capital across markets and asset classes. 3 On the other hand, many regulators use LTCM as an example of how bad things could get in the hedge fund industry if they are allowed to continue to have a free reign. They argue that since hedge funds face hardly any regulatory constraints, many of them are likely to resort to very risky investment strategies. If a significant number of hedge funds indulge in excessive risk taking the way LTCM did, it could have disastrous consequences for the stability of financial markets worldwide, and create enormous systemic risk. Therefore, they have been pressing for increased regulation of hedge funds. 4 This debate on whether hedge funds should be closely regulated is still going on, and in the absence of extensive, scientific information and analysis, is difficult to resolve. The only way to settle this argument is to raise and answer some fundamental questions about the riskiness and capital adequacy of the hedge fund industry, which are partly motivated by the lessons from LTCM. How risky are hedge funds, in general? Do a majority of hedge funds have adequate capital to back their positions? Was LTCM's capital problem indicative of a more widespread capital problem in the hedge fund industry, or was it just an extreme outlier? These are precisely the questions that our paper addresses, by doing an extensive, systematic study of the hedge fund industry.
Like Jorion (2000) , we propose a VaR approach, since VaR not only measures the maximum amount of assets a fund can lose in a certain time period with a certain probability, but can also be used to measure the equity capital needed to cover those losses. We analyze the VaR for each fund, its distribution across all funds, and compute a VaR based estimate of required equity capital for each fund. This required equity is then compared to the actual fund equity to determine how many hedge funds are under-capitalized. We conduct extensive robustness checks on the VaR estimates that we obtain to ensure that our results and inferences are reliable. 2 For example, the World Bank Treasurer said in May 2001 -"A lot of talented money managers with good risk discipline have moved into the hedge fund arena". In fact, the World Bank has already moved about 6% of its large pension fund investments (their total pension funds portfolio exceeds $10 billion) into hedge funds, and plans to increase this percentage to 10%. Also, the report on Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Managers (Feb 2000) says "by participating in the market as risk seekers, Hedge Fund Managers play a unique and critical role in financial markets by providing needed liquidity and reducing systematic risk". 3 In a similar vein, Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2000) show that there is no empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that any hedge fund was responsible for the Asian currency crisis. 4 For example, the President's Working Group on Financial Markets says in April 2000-"Another area of dramatic growth .... is the hedge fund industry. The Working Group has recommended several steps for legislative consideration. Although hedge funds secure their capital from high-income individuals and invest in sophisticated markets, we are concerned with their scope of activity, particularly where there is potential for undisclosed, high levels of leverage. Such activity has the potential to bring harm to third parties when high leverage, market position and lack of disclosure result in the unfortunate events like those of September and October of 1998 when we all are aware LTCM had its problems". Also, the joint report on government securities by the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the SEC says "their capacity for leverage allows hedge funds to take large trading positions disproportionate to their capital base".
We also benchmark hedge fund risk to the risk of an equivalent investment in a broad based equity index (the S&P 500), to gain some perspective on average hedge fund risk when compared to average market risk.
In addition to these primary questions, we also address issues related to the techniques that are appropriate for risk estimation in the hedge fund industry. We characterize the distribution of hedge fund returns, and analyze whether VaR is a better measure of risk (for evaluating capital adequacy) for hedge funds than traditional measures like the standard deviation of returns and leverage ratios, especially if there is significant non-normality in the return distribution. We examine whether the risk characteristics of dead funds are significantly different from live funds, and if VaR is able to capture these differences. We segment all our results by hedge fund investment styles, in order to understand if there are significant risk and capital adequacy differences in hedge funds across styles.
Our paper is the first one to address capital adequacy issues in the entire hedge fund industry.
Although Jorion's study is the first one to apply the VaR methodology to hedge funds, he examines only a single fund, while we examine nearly thirteen hundred hedge funds. Fung and Hsieh (2000) examine hedge fund performance and risk in some major market events/crisis. However, they adopt a traditional mean-variance approach, which we show is not very effective in capturing hedge fund risk. Therefore, in contrast, we use the VaR approach to study hedge fund risk. Lhabitant (2001) also studies the investment styles of hedge funds and fund of funds, extends the factor models to estimate the VaR of the funds, and reports preliminary VaR figures and stress testing results using his methodology. However, he does not use the return information directly in estimating the VaR, and does not examine any capital adequacy issues in this industry.
We find that a vast majority of hedge funds (97.1% of the live funds) are adequately capitalized, contrary to the commonly perceived notion of hedge funds being too risky (and hence susceptible to failure due to lack of adequate capital), and conclude that the LTCM debacle was an extreme case, not representative of the hedge fund industry as a whole. The (2.9%) live funds that are found to be under-capitalized are mostly small funds (with median net assets of about $10.0m) that together constitute only about 0.6% of the total net assets in the hedge fund industry. We present extensive backtesting evidence and robustness test results that strongly suggest that our VaR estimation methodology (using Extreme Value Theory) is reliable, and it's application for inferring capital adequacy is valid. For dead funds, we find that the estimated VaR increases by an average of 74% over the two years immediately preceding the fund's death, while no such trend is observed for live funds, indicating that VaR, estimated using fund returns, is very effective in capturing elements of hedge fund risk that lead to their death. This supports the use of VaR for capital estimation. We also find significant non-normality in hedge fund returns, in terms of high kurtosis. Due to this reason, traditional standard deviation based risk measures underestimate the true risk of hedge fund returns. Leverage also does a poor job in capturing hedge fund risk, which is not surprising since leverage is just a (noisy) proxy for credit risk faced by debt holders, and, in most instances, does not have any correlation with the true risks of the asset portfolio of the fund. Our results are robust to time horizon and return frequency issues. In benchmarking tests, we find that a majority of hedge funds have risk that is comparable to the risk of an equivalent investment in a broad equity market index (the S&P 500), which further reinforces our main conclusion from the paper, that the hedge fund industry is adequately capitalized.
In summary, our study sheds light on important risk management, capital adequacy, and regulatory issues in the hedge fund industry. The results of our analysis suggest that, purely from the perspective of capital adequacy concerns, the arguments in favor of letting the hedge fund industry continue without much regulation outweigh those in favor of more regulation, since most hedge funds seem to be operating within prudent capital adequacy norms even without any regulation. 5 This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 explains the concept of VaR and its application in determining capital requirements. Section 2 describes the data used in the study. Section 3 explains the research methodology. The empirical results for capital adequacy, backtesting and robustness tests are presented and discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1.
Value-at-Risk and capital adequacy
VaR can be described as a summary measure of the worst loss that can happen over a target horizon with a given confidence level. In other words, VaR is a probability statement about the potential change in the value of a portfolio resulting from changes in market factors over a specified time interval. More formally, it describes the quantile of the projected distribution of gains and losses over the target horizon. If c is the selected confidence level, VaR corresponds to the 1-c lower tail. It is one of the most important developments in risk management over the past decade, and is especially suited for measurement and aggregation of diverse risky positions across an entire institution using a common conceptual framework.
VaR is calculated in currency units (dollars) and is designed to cover most, but not all, of the losses that a risky business might face. Therefore, it has the intuitive interpretation of the amount 5 We do not analyze systemic risk linkages in this paper. An analysis of these linkages might help in understanding how damaging a fund's default could be for the hedge fund industry as well as for all other financial services sectors. Nevertheless, the fact that all the under-capitalized funds are small funds, which together account for a very small fraction of the entire hedge fund industry, indicates that these (undercapitalized) funds are not large enough to cause significant systemic risk concerns. In addition, an ex-ante analysis of systemic risk linkages is not possible in the hedge fund industry due to the coarseness of available data.
of economic or equity capital that must be held to support that particular level of risky business activity. In fact, the definition of VaR is completely compatible with the role of equity as perceived by many financial institutions -while reserves or provisions are held to cover expected losses incurred in the normal course of business, equity capital is held to provide a capital cushion against any potential unexpected losses. Since all unexpected losses cannot be covered with 100% certainty, the level of this capital cushion must be determined within prudent solvency guidelines over a reasonable time horizon needed to identify and resolve problem situations.
This definition of risk capital also encompasses a much broader concept of risk, than the traditional concept of capital adequacy using leverage ratios. Leverage indicates the extent to which a firm uses borrowed funds in relation to the investment by equity holders. Higher leverage implies that, ceteris paribus, the firm has higher obligatory (interest + principal repayment) payments, hence a higher probability of default on its debt obligations. Under this narrow concept of risk, firms that have no leverage by definition have zero probability of default on their debt obligations, since they don't have any debt. However, they may still have significant risk of not being able to continue with their business, which is not reflected in leverage, since leverage only depends on the liabilities side of the balance sheet (and ignores the asset side of the balance sheet totally). This may be appropriate for industrial firms, but certainly not for financial firms. Financial firms hold traded assets that may be very volatile. Further, these assets are frequently bought and sold, or must be marked-to-market periodically, hence movements in the market values of these assets have a direct financial consequence for these firms. A financial firm with no debt may go bankrupt if it suffers large losses on its asset portfolio. The potential for such losses, in relation to its equity capital, is the most important determinant for capital adequacy of such firms, not the leverage ratio. Of course, leverage will magnify the negative (or positive) impact of experiencing such a large loss (or gain). Therefore, for financial firms (including hedge funds), capital adequacy is dependent on the risk of their asset portfolios (for which VaR may be an appropriate measure), since equity capital must provide a cushion against potential unexpected losses. This risk is not likely to be effectively captured by leverage.
The philosophy that economically determined VaR is the relevant measure for determining capital requirements for risky businesses is also being increasingly adopted by regulators and In this paper, we use 3 times the 99% 1-month VaR as the required equity capital for hedge funds.
The time horizon used is 1-month instead of ten days because hedge funds are quite different from commercial banks. As pointed out by Jorion (2000) , commercial banks are closely supervised by regulators, hence they are in a position to react to potential difficulties much sooner. Hedge funds are far less regulated and since they are not allowed to raise funds from the public, they would normally have a harder time raising additional capital when needed, which would be precisely when they have suffered abnormal losses. Hence a 1-month target horizon is more appropriate for hedge funds.
Data
Hedge funds often have complex portfolios including nonlinear assets like options, interest rate derivatives, etc. For such a portfolio, estimating the VaR (or equivalently the probability of large downward moves, deep in the tails of the probability distribution) is a difficult task, since both the non-Gaussian nature of the fluctuations of the underlying assets and the non-linear dependence of the price of the derivatives must be dealt with. Moreover, there is no data available on the position holdings of hedge funds, since it constitutes proprietary trading information that they never disclose. Therefore, it is not possible to estimate Liang (2000) indicates that the TASS data has some advantages over the other databases because it contains more dissolved funds and is more accurate in describing fund characteristics.
In order to estimate the VaR of these funds, we need a certain minimum number of observations.
We use a five-year window as the minimum time period required to estimate the VaR. 
Research methodology
We estimate the VaR for each hedge fund using Extreme Value Theory (EVT). This VaR is used to estimate the risk capital requirement for hedge funds, which is compared with the actual equity capital backing the positions of these funds in order to evaluate their capital adequacy. We compute a capitalization ratio (the Cap ratio) defined as follows,
where the required equity is 3 times the 99% 1-month VaR of the fund, while the actual equity is taken from the data. A Cap ratio less than zero implies that the actual equity is not sufficient to cover the risk of the portfolio as per the VaR approach. Hence funds with negative Cap ratios are identified as being under-capitalized. Further segmentation by fund styles, and by their current status (whether they are living or dead), helps us evaluate the risk exposures of these funds by styles, and allows us to determine the impact of capital adequacy on the survival rates of hedge funds. In addition, we do various robustness tests, and benchmark the risk of these funds to an equivalent investment in a broad-based equity index such as the S&P 500 index.
VaR using Extreme Value Theory (EVT)
The objective of estimating VaR in this study is to estimate the capital requirement for hedge funds. Equity capital, by definition, is the capital reserve required to bear unexpected losses.
Most of the unexpected losses arise due to extreme events in financial markets, such as the R mean = Mean fund return from historical distribution, R 99% = Cut off return at 99% confidence level estimated using EVT, TNA = The total net assets (equity) of a fund.
As can be seen, this VaR is a VaR relative to the mean, which specifies the dollar loss relative to the expected return, instead of the VaR from zero returns, which is the dollar loss relative to zero (without reference to the expected return over the target horizon). For a horizon of a month, hedge fund returns can be quite significant. Hence, VaR relative to the mean is more appropriate since it views risk in terms of the deviation from the expected value on a target date, correctly accounting for the cost of capital. 11 The capital requirement is then taken as 3 times this VaR number, which is the minimum amount of equity necessary to support the level of risk inherent in each fund's operations. As explained earlier, the safety multiplier of 3 takes model misspecification and estimation errors into account and is recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. We examine the validity of the safety multiplier of 3 in later sections of this paper.
EVT considers the statistical distribution of extreme returns, instead of the distribution of all returns. It provides us the limiting distribution of the extreme returns over a time period, which is independent of the distribution of returns itself. EVT focuses only on extreme values rather than all the data, hence fitting only the tail of the distribution. Therefore, EVT can capture event risk, which normal distributions cannot. For modeling extreme values, there are two different, but related, approaches. The first approach consists of fitting one of the three standard extreme value distributions (Fréchet, Weibull, or Gumbel) to block maxima values in a time series, while the second approach models the distribution of exceedances over a threshold as a generalized
Pareto distribution (also known as Peak Over Threshold (POT) method).
Let R i be the (random) returns for a hedge fund, at any frequency, say daily intervals. In the first approach (the block maxima method), let X i be the maximum (or minimum) return values observed in successive but non-overlapping periods. The X i observations constitute extreme returns over the time period. If the return observations are statistically independent and drawn from the same distribution, then the exact cumulative distribution of the maximum (H(x)) can be written as a function of the cumulative distribution of all returns (F(x)), and the length of the period, n, as follows:
However, if the distribution of returns is not known, then this result is of little practical use. In this case, the Fisher-Tippett (1928) theorem shows that in the limit, the asymptotic distribution of the maximum variable X i , reduced by a location parameter µ and a scale parameter σ, converges to a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution as follows:
The parameter ξ is called the tail index, since it models the tail of the distribution. The scale parameter (σ) can be interpreted to be the volatility of the extreme values, while the location parameter (µ) represents the average of the extreme values. According to the tail index value, three types of extreme value distributions are obtained: the Fréchet distribution (ξ>0, fat tails), the Weibull distribution (ξ<0, thin tails), and the Gumbel distribution (ξ=0, no tails). Most financial time series usually exhibit fat tails, and hence have ξ>0.
In the POT method, the distribution of the exceedances over a threshold is modeled. For random returns R i , the POT method models the distribution F u of values of returns above a certain threshold u. This conditional excess distribution function is defined as
As observed by Pickands (1975) , the conditional excess distribution function, for large u, is well approximated by the generalized Pareto distribution (GPD) as follows:
In this case as well, ξ is the tail index and σ is the scale parameter. This generalized distribution nests three standard distributions: the Pareto distribution (ξ>0, polynomially decreasing tail), the uniform distribution (ξ<0, short tail), and the exponential distribution (ξ=0, exponentially decreasing tail). Again, only distributions with ξ>0 are suitable for modeling financial time series which exhibit fat tails.
Between these two methods of implementing EVT, the threshold method is preferred in applications where there is less data available, since this method used data more efficiently.
Hence, in this paper, we use the POT method to estimate the 99-percentile return (R 99% ).
In the POT method, the conditional excess distribution function (F u ) can be written in terms of the cumulative distribution function (F) of all returns as follows:
From this, an analytical expression can be derived for R 99% . F u can be replaced by the generalized Pareto distribution. F(u) is deterministic, since it is the fraction of observations below the threshold, hence F(u)=(N-n)/N, where n is the number of observations above the threshold, while N is the total number of observations. Therefore,
F(x) denotes the VaR confidence level. Let p denote the probability of exceeding the VaR, which would be given by 1-F(x). For example, for the 99% VaR, p would be 0.01. Also, the x itself denotes R 99% . Substituting for F(x) and x, we get the expression for R 99% as
When ξ=0, the form of the generalized Pareto distribution is different, and the expression for R 99% is 0 , log % 99
For a sample of return observations, the parameters of the generalized Pareto distribution can be estimated using maximum likelihood methods. 12 Using the estimated parameters, appropriate VaR estimates can be obtained at any confidence level based on (9) and (10).
Estimating tail conditional losses
In addition to estimating the VaR, we estimate another measure of risk called the tail conditional loss (TCL, also known as expected shortfall). This measure estimates the potential size of the expected loss if it exceeds the VaR. It can be argued that the minimum capital requirement should be sufficient to cover the losses, if an extreme loss occurs. A 99% VaR only tells us the minimum loss that can be expected 1% of the time -it does not tell us anything about how large those losses might be, if they occur. TCL provides an estimate of how large these losses might be, hence they can be useful in determining capital adequacy. The ratio of TCL to VaR can provide a more objective basis of determining the appropriate capital multiplier that should be used in conjunction with VaR, instead of the standard multiplier of 3 recommended by Basle. In other words, the ratio of TCL to VaR can provide important information regarding how safe it is to use a multiplier of 3 in the hedge fund industry.
More formally, TCL is defined as:
Using the mean excess function for the generalized Pareto distribution, with parameter ξ<1, we get the expression for the expected return conditional on it being in the 1% tail as: 13 [ ]
Depending on how heavy-tailed the return distribution is, any level of TCL can be obtained for a given level of VaR. Therefore, it is useful to quantify the expected losses in the tail of the return distribution, in addition to estimating the cutoff losses corresponding to a certain quantile.
VaR using normality assumption
Many traditional risk based capital measures assume the return distribution to be normal, though often there are significant departures from normality (our results show a significantly high level of kurtosis in hedge fund returns across fund styles). A comparison of risk capital measures based on the extreme value distributions with those based on the assumption of normality would highlight the error introduced in estimating capital requirements by assuming returns to be normal. Towards this objective, we re-estimate the VaR of each fund using the standard deviation of historical returns, assuming the return distribution to be normal, instead of estimating it using EVT as in the previous case. Hence, in this case, the 99% VaR is defined as
where σ R is the standard deviation of historical fund returns. The capital requirement is again specified as three times this VaR, and the capitalization ratio (the Cap ratio) is computed in a similar manner. Again, a negative Cap ratio would imply a level of equity less than that required, and hence the fund would be categorized as being under-capitalized. In this section as well, the funds are segmented by investment styles and by their current status (whether they are live or dead), in order to evaluate the risk exposures of funds by styles and the impact of capital 13 A general result concerning the existence of moments for generalized Pareto distributions is that for all integers r such that r<1/ξ, the r-th first moments exist.
adequacy on their survival rates. The differences in the levels of under-capitalization using the VaR from the extreme value distribution and the standard deviation based VaR can be attributed solely to the departures from normality in the actual return distributions of hedge funds.
Results and robustness tests
In this section, we first present the main results of our capital adequacy tests, and then present extensive evidence on the robustness and reliability of our results and conclusions. funds. This is consistent with the notion that hedge fund risk is more event-driven and non-linear than regular price fluctuations under normal circumstances. Hedge funds often implement opportunistic trading strategies and bet on major markets events worldwide. Hedge fund returns are heavily affected by these events, hence extreme positive (as in the famous "attack" on Sterling by George Soros' funds in 1992) and negative (as in the market downturn for LTCM in 1998) returns may be realized. All these events may cause some observed returns to be well beyond three times the standard deviation, which would have virtually zero probability of occurrence under the normal distribution assumption. Therefore, using just the second moment to measure hedge fund risk is inappropriate, and we turn to VaR based on EVT for evaluating hedge fund risk in this paper. Table 1 also shows that there are significant differences in hedge fund return distributions across investment styles, implying that a study by fund styles is more insightful than an aggregated study that groups all hedge funds together. The 99% VaR shows the loss limit that is expected to be breached 1% of the time. For example, on average, a US equity hedge fund is expected to lose more than $18.5 million in a month with a 1%
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probability. It is not surprising to find that dead funds are generally smaller than live funds.
Dead funds lose capital because of poor performance, or they are unable to reach a critical mass, so they die. The months immediately preceding a fund's demise are usually characterized by large negative returns, hence these funds shrink in size considerably before closing down.
Because fund assets differ, a VaR relative to fund assets is more appropriate than the absolute The main results of this paper are presented in Table 3 . The numbers reported are the total number of funds, the number of funds that are under-capitalized, the percentage of undercapitalized funds, and the level of under-capitalization (the Cap ratio). The results are reported for both live and dead funds under each style classification. The under-capitalization figures in Table 3 have been calculated using the EVT VaRs based on sixty monthly returns.
It is surprising to find that very few hedge funds are under-capitalized, for both the live and dead fund groups. For the live funds, about 2.9% (26 out of 906) of the funds are under-capitalized, while the corresponding fraction is 10.8% (41 out of 380) for the dead funds. 14 The median (mean) capitalization ratio is 1.5 (3.3) for live funds, compared with 0.9 (1.5) for dead funds. Remember that the lower the capitalization ratio, the less the actual equity capital is, as compared to the required equity. Comparing the two fund groups, we observe that, on average, dead funds have a greater extent of under-capitalization than the live funds. This is somewhat consistent with the hypothesis that one of the reasons for a fund's death is under-capitalization. When a fund does not have enough equity capital, it can run into debt trouble after a market crisis occurs. Investor withdrawals and margin calls from lenders may eventually drive the fund out of business.
However, under-capitalization does not appear to be the main reason for fund death, since nearly 90% of the dead funds had adequate equity capital right until the fund exit date. Therefore, other reasons like poor performance, mergers and acquisitions, etc., may contribute more to the demise of a hedge fund than capital adequacy.
For the live funds, the only styles with significant levels of under-capitalization are the fixed income directional funds (3 out of 27, or about 11%), and pure emerging market funds (6 out of 66, or about 9%). Amongst dedicated short seller funds, there is only one fund (out of ten) that lacks adequate capital, which is not significant, even though in percentage terms it is high (10% of that the median under-capitalized live fund has equity capital of about 81% of the required capital (remember that the required capital was scaled up by a safety multiplier of 3). Even the largest of these under-capitalized funds has total net assets of $591.5m, which is one order of magnitude smaller than the total net assets of LTCM before its debacle. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that these under-capitalized funds are not large enough to pose significant systemic risk to financial markets worldwide.
An important question is whether the inferences arrived at using the VaR based capital measures can also be arrived at by just observing the leverage ratios of these hedge funds. Table 4 presents the TCL/VaR ratios by hedge fund investment styles. The median ratios for live funds and dead funds are 1.32 and 1.27, respectively. None of the median ratios in Table 4 exceeds 3. In fact, for 95.7% of the live funds and 95.8% of the dead funds, the TCL/VaR ratio is less than 3. 16 This implies that in most instances, even if the VaR is breached, the expected loss is likely to be less than 3 times the VaR. Therefore, using a safety multiplier of 3 is appropriate for examining capital adequacy.
In summary, the EVT VaR based results in Table 3 show that the vast majority of live hedge funds have adequate capital. Even a large fraction of dead funds had adequate capital right up to their demise. Moreover, the live funds that are under-capitalized are relatively small, and constitute a very small fraction of the total net assets in the hedge fund industry.
VaR based on standard deviation
In the previous section, we report results from VaR estimated using EVT, where we only assume an asymptotic distribution for extreme returns, and do not make any assumptions about the overall fund return distribution. We also report in Table 1 that hedge fund returns exhibit significant non-normality, especially a high level of kurtosis (indicating fat tails in the distribution). An interesting issue then is to compare the EVT VaR with the VaR based on the assumption of normality, using the standard deviation of historical returns. By this analysis, we can understand how much error is introduced by imposing the constraint of normal distribution.
Hence, we re-estimate the VaR for each fund using the standard deviation of historical returns and calculate the degree of under-capitalization. The estimation procedure is explained in section 16 We also recomputed the Cap ratios for hedge funds using the maximum of the TCL or 3 times the VaR as the required equity capital, and found no change in the number of funds that are under-capitalized.
3.3 and equation (13). If a traditional standard deviation based risk measure can capture risk adequately, then there is no need for more complex EVT based measures. Table 5 with those of Table   3 , we find that using the standard deviation based VaR leads to an underestimation of capital requirements, especially for dead funds. Standard deviation based VaR (using normality assumption) is able to detect under-capitalization in 2.3% of the live funds, and in only 1.8% of the dead funds, while the corresponding numbers are 2.9% and 10.8% respectively using the EVT VaR. This is not surprising, because assuming normality ignores the fat tails of hedge fund distribution, which in turn underestimates the risk of extremely low return realizations, and hence underestimates the extent of under-capitalization. This is especially true for dead funds, which have higher kurtosis and negative skewness of returns, therefore a greater probability of experiencing extreme negative returns. EVT better captures the probability of occurrence of extreme negative returns, since it focuses only on extreme return observations. Therefore it provides a more accurate measure of VaR for the fund. Statistically, the VaR model verification using these failure rates is a sequence of Bernoulli trials, where the outcome of each trial is binary -either the actual loss exceeds the VaR level, or it does not. Let p be the predicted failure rate of the model (p=1-c, where c is the confidence level for the VaR). If the total number of such trials is T, then the number of failures x follows a binomial probability distribution:
This binomial distribution is used to test whether the number of failures is acceptably small (or large). It is also used to test the null hypothesis that the frequency of failures is equal to the predicted failure rate of the model. In testing this hypothesis, however, there is a tradeoff between type I error (rejecting a correct model) and type II error (accepting an incorrect model).
Ideally, one would want both these errors to be low, so that the test is powerful. The 95%
confidence regions for such a test can be estimated using the tail points of the log-likelihood ratio:
where N is the actual number of exceedances in T trials. 17 This likelihood ratio is asymptotically distributed Chi-square with one degree of freedom under the null hypothesis that p is the true probability. For example, for p=0.01, the null hypothesis would be rejected if LR>3.84.
For small values of the parameter p, it is difficult to test the validity of a VaR model, as the number of observations required is very large. For example, for 100 trials and p=0.05, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected as long as N is within the confidence interval [2≤N≤9] . If the actual number of exceedances is greater than 9, then the model is significantly underestimating the true VaR. On the other hand, if the actual number of exceedances is less than 2, then the model is significantly overestimating the VaR. However, if p=0.01, then the non-rejection region with 100 trials is [N≤4], i.e., there is no way to assess if the model is overestimating risk (we can still test if the model is underestimating risk). Since our basic objective in this paper is to test for capital adequacy, we are more concerned with the risk of underestimating extreme returns, rather than overestimating them. Hence, this approach is still very useful for our purposes, even for p=0.01.
In order to backtest our VaR estimation approach extensively, we examine the failure rates for 3 different levels of p -0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 -that correspond to VaR confidence levels of 99%, 95%, 17 See Kupiec (1995) and Jorion (2000) for details. and 90% respectively. The objective is to test the validity of the VaR estimation over a fairly wide range in the left tail of the hedge fund return distribution.
Since we need a large number of observations to backtest the VaR model, we can do that only for a subset of funds in our sample. Table 6 presents detailed backtesting results for 64 (46 live and 18 dead) hedge funds for which we have over 15 years (180 months) of monthly return data (again, this does include 18 dead funds to mitigate the survivorship bias in our results). We use the first 60 months of return data to estimate the VaR at the three confidence levels, and then examine whether the actual loss in the 61st month is greater than the estimated VaR or not. Then we roll forward by one month and repeat this exercise. This way, we conduct 120 trials for each fund, and then examine the number of funds for which the actual number of exceedances is outside of the confidence interval estimated for N.
As shown in Table 6 , only 11% of the hedge funds fail the backtest. For 5 out of 46 live funds, and 2 out of 18 dead funds, there are more violations than normal for the VaR. For 89% of the live and dead funds backtested, the EVT based VaR is able to forecast extreme returns accurately at 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level. In addition, there are some funds for which the EVT based VaR overstates risk, as evidenced by the number of violations being statistically lower than that predicted by the VaR confidence level. However, these funds are not of concern for our objectives, since overestimation of risk only makes our results stronger. It is interesting to note that all the 7 funds that failed the backtest have an abnormally high level of kurtosis of returns, ranging from 20 to 78. Most of these funds also exhibit negative skewness in returns.
Then, in order to test a larger number of funds, we enlarge the sample of funds to 97 (72 live and 25 dead) funds, for which we have 160 months or more of return data. In this case, we are able to conduct 100 trials (which we believe is the minimum number of trials needed to reliably backtest the model). The results for these 97 funds are similar to the backtesting results presented in Table   6 for 64 funds. Figure 1 presents the plots of the number of violations for each fund (categorized by live and dead, and by the three confidence levels of the VaR), the expected number of violations based on the confidence level (for example, we should expect to see 5 violations in 100 months for the 95% VaR), and a 95% confidence interval on the expected number of violations (for example, for the 95% VaR, if the number of violations is either less than 2 or greater than 9 then the VaR model is not accurate). It is clear from the plots that the number of violations for most of the funds is not statistically different from the expected number of violations for its confidence level. Once again, our concern is limited to funds that exhibit a greater than expected number of violations, since for these funds the implication is that the EVT based VaR approach understates risk. 92% of the 97 funds pass this test -we observe underestimation of risk in only 6
(only 5 at the 1% and 10% levels) out of 72 live and 2 out of 25 dead funds.
The results from these backtests give us a fair amount of confidence that our VaR estimation approach is valid and accurate, since the estimated VaRs are able to forecast the lower range of hedge fund returns fairly accurately.
Robustness tests
In this sub-section, we present extensive robustness tests to ensure that the results we report for the EVT VaR based on monthly returns are reliable.
Estimation of VaR confidence intervals
Many of the hedge funds in our sample do not have a very long history of returns. We do impose a minimum five-year return history requirement, but for 77% of the hedge funds in our sample (683 out of 906 live, and 304 out of 380 dead) we have between five and ten years of return data.
Only for the remaining 23% of the funds do we have ten years or more of return history.
Therefore, from a statistical perspective, for many funds, the sample of observations is smaller than what would ideally be needed. Due to this reason, it is important to estimate the tail quantile estimation errors. We do that by constructing (95%) confidence intervals on our (99%)
VaR estimates. These confidence intervals provide important information about the reliability of the point estimates of VaR that are used in paper. Since we use EVT to estimate the VaR, we can use profile likelihood methods to estimate the confidence intervals on these VaRs. 18 Given the relative uncertainty about returns in the tail of the distribution, the upper bound of the confidence interval for the VaR provides a reasonable upper limit for how high the VaR could be in reality. A ratio of the upper bound of the confidence interval to the VaR itself can then be compared with the Basle multiplier of 3 to examine how often the standard multiplier of 3 fails to capture the true risk of extremely low returns. to be under-capitalized, which is only marginally higher than the under-capitalization using 3 times the VaR as the required equity (2.9% for live, and 10.8% for dead funds).
This analysis helps us estimate the error in our estimates due to small sample sizes. We find that the safety multiplier of 3 takes care of most of this error, and our basic capital adequacy results
are not sensitive to the sample size issue.
In-sample test of VaR estimates
As a further test of robustness, we check the EVT based estimates of the 99% VaR against the VaR estimates obtained using the empirically observed returns during that period. This is an insample test of the VaR estimation procedure, in terms of its ability to correctly calibrate to the lower range of returns in the tails of the hedge fund return distribution. Since we need at least 100 return observations to estimate the 99% VaR based on the empirical return distribution, we conduct this test for a subsample of 491 funds (365 live and 126 dead funds) for which we have 100 months or more of return data. of the dead funds), this ratio is greater than 1. This implies that in general, the EVT VaR estimates tend to be higher than the in-sample empirical VaR estimates. This upward bias in risk estimation only makes our capital adequacy results stronger. Amongst the hedge funds for which this ratio is below 1, the lowest value is 0.69 for live funds and 0.72 for dead funds. Using a multiplier of 3 more than takes care of the underestimation risk in these hedge funds. It is also interesting to note that this ratio is slightly higher for dead funds, i.e., the EVT approach appears to attribute a greater probability to the occurrence of extreme low returns in dead funds. This clearly is a positive indication that the EVT approach is capturing the underlying risk in hedge fund returns.
Any remaining estimation error is more than compensated by the safety multiplier of 3.
In theory, if the sample of observations is large enough, and the estimation process is accurate, the EVT VaR should converge to the empirical VaR, since over a large enough period, the prediction of extreme returns should reflect what has actually been observed historically. We examine this issue by comparing the EVT VaR to the empirical VaR using 8,082 daily return observations for the S&P 500 index (32 years of data, Jan 70 -Dec 01) for a $100m position in the index. The results are reported in Table 8 . It can be seen that the EVT VaR ($11.18m) is almost identical to the in-sample empirical VaR ($11.17m ). This reinforces our confidence in the EVT VaR estimation approach.
Testing the robustness of VaR to the length of the estimation window
Next, we examine the bias, if any, introduced in our VaR estimates due to reliance on a return history as short as five years for some funds. One may argue that a five-year window may be too short for estimating the true VaR, and could ignore the impact of catastrophic events that may not have been observed during those five years, but may be observed over a longer time period. 19 However, for many of our funds we have much more than 5 years of data. 20 that based on the fund's entire return history (fifteen years or more). The median of these ratios is 0.90 for live funds and 0.87 for dead funds. Therefore, on average, there does appear to be some underestimation of risk for the median fund, if a shorter return history is used. However, the extent of underestimation of this risk is small. For the median fund, the risk is underestimated by 10% for live funds, and 13% for dead funds, by using the shorter five-year return history. Even for the worst case of underestimation, the ratio is 0.59 for live funds and 0.56 for dead funds.
Therefore, even for these cases, the safety multiplier of 3 more than compensates for the underestimation of risk due to reliance on a shorter history of fund returns. Also, for many funds (34.8% of live funds and 33.3% of dead funds), the shorter return history actually overestimates risk, when compared to the VaR estimated using the longer time series of returns for the same fund.
We further examine the impact of a shorter return history by using a long time series of returns for the S&P 500 index. We estimate the VaR of a $100 million position in the S&P index by using
19 However, as we have pointed out, over the most recent five-year period used in our study (July 1997 to June 2002), three major events, the Asian currency crisis of 1997, the Russian debt crisis of 1998, and the equity market crash from March 2000 onwards, were experienced. Therefore, the hedge fund returns exhibited during these five years include return observations during fairly volatile times, with some very extreme observations. 20 In our sample of 906 live funds, 538 funds have more than 7 years data, 223 funds have more than 10 years data, and 46 funds have more than 15 years data. Similarly, in our sample of 380 dead funds, 213 funds have more than 7 years data, 76 funds have more than 10 years data, and 18 funds have more than 15 years data. We use all the return data of a fund to estimate its VaR.
five years (60 months, Jan 97 -Dec 01) of monthly returns, and then compare it to the VaR obtained by using 32 years (384 months, Jan 70 -Dec 01) of data. It can be safely assumed that nearly every kind of economic situation has been experienced in the last 32 years, which have also been witness to many extreme events in financial markets. This comparison indicates how different the risk estimates might be if a much longer time history of returns were used. As shown in Table 8 , the VaR using five years of data ($13.44m) is actually higher than the VaR using 32 years of data ($11.54m). 21 There is no reason to believe that the shorter time history is introducing any significant bias in the estimates of VaR. Therefore, as we have shown, the use of a minimum five-year window for estimating VaR is appropriate.
Impact of return frequency on risk estimation
As far as the specific estimation methodology is concerned, it may be argued that the results based on monthly returns may smooth out the true volatility of hedge fund returns at the aggregate level, hence underestimate the true VaR and capital adequacy for the industry. In addition, previous studies have found that daily stock returns exhibit more non-normality than monthly returns. If hedge fund returns are significantly non-normal, then it should be easier to detect this deviation from normality using daily data than using monthly data. Therefore, daily returns may be more appropriate than monthly returns for estimating the risk exposure for the hedge fund industry.
Since daily hedge fund return data is not available, we use the S&P 500 index daily and monthly returns to analyze the impact of return frequency on risk estimation. 22 The objective is to address the issue of the potential bias that may be introduced by using monthly returns instead of daily returns. We use the S&P 500 data from January 1970 to December 2001. We estimate the monthly VaR, first using the 384 monthly return observations, and then using the 8,082 daily return observations over the exact same period. A comparison of the two VaRs would highlight the differences caused by return frequency alone. Note that the daily VaRs have been converted to monthly VaRs by using a multiplier of √21 (assuming an average of 21 trading days in a month). Table 8 presents the results of this analysis. Daily S&P returns exhibit significantly higher kurtosis than monthly returns over the same period. The negative skewness in the returns is also more pronounced for daily returns than for monthly returns. However, the estimates of VaR are not very different -the VaR using daily returns is $11.18m, while it is $11.54m using monthly 21 We also computed the VaR for the S&P index for each of the 28 overlapping five-year periods between 1970 and 2001 (from 1970-74, 1971-75, and so on till 1997-2001) . Though not reported in the paper, these VaRs varied between $7.86m and $17.29m, with an average value of $11.44m, which is almost identical to the VaR of $11.54m based on all 32 years. This further supports our inference that using a five-year window does not introduce any significant systematic bias in our results. 22 Daily hedge fund return data is only available for very few hedge funds (from HFR), and for a very short period of time, so it cannot be used in any meaningful analysis yet.
returns. This indicates that the VaR estimated for hedge funds using monthly data is fairly accurate, and the return frequency issue does not introduce any significant bias in the results. 23
The effectiveness of VaR as a risk measure for hedge funds
Standard deviation is ruled out as the correct measure for hedge fund risk, due to the nonnormality in hedge fund returns. Leverage ratio is also ruled out as the correct measure since leverage is a very narrow and noisy measure of the credit risk faced by the debt holders, and does not proxy asset risk in any meaningful way. However, even VaR can be used as an appropriate risk measure for hedge funds only if it can effectively detect the changing risk patterns in hedge funds over time. We study the time series patterns in the VaRs for dead and live funds, to understand if the risk characteristics of dead funds are captured by VaR or not. In general, the risk for dead funds increases toward the fund death date, either because of bad performance that leads to loss of capital and investor withdrawals, or because of the excessive risk shifting incentives that occur when a fund has been performing poorly in the past. If VaR is an appropriate risk measure for hedge funds, then we should be able to detect a significant increasing trend for VaR over time, for dead funds, as the fund death date approaches. On the other hand, we should not expect any such systematic trend in the VaRs for live funds.
Therefore, we analyze the group of dead funds with a return history of at least seven years prior to their death. We compute their VaRs over three rolling time periods of 60 months each -the five years immediately preceding the fund death (window 3), the five years ending one year before the fund death date (window 2), and the five years ending two years before the fund death date (window 1). This way, we have estimates of 60 month rolling VaRs two years prior to fund death, one year prior to fund death, and just before fund death. For comparison, we estimate the same three rolling VaRs for live funds as well, the only difference being that the time horizon for live funds is the same for all funds, ending June 2002, while for dead funds, the time horizon for each fund is different, depending upon when the fund died. Therefore, for live funds, the three rolling The results from these tests answer two fundamental questions. First, is VaR an appropriate risk measure for hedge funds -does it capture any elements of hedge fund risk which are present only in funds about to die? Second, if VaR is indeed an appropriate risk measure in theory, is the estimation methodology used in this paper appropriate, i.e., in the absence of position level data, can a VaR estimated based on 60 monthly return observations capture elements of hedge fund risk that have implications for the fund's survival? If VaR is indeed an appropriate risk measure and this estimation methodology is appropriate, then VaR can be safely used for capital estimation, which is the primary objective of this study.
In figure 4 , we present the results for the 538 live and 213 dead funds that have at least a sevenyear return history, and compute three rolling VaRs based on 60 monthly return observations each, as explained earlier.
The box plots present the ratios for window 2 VaR to window 1 VaR, and the ratios for window 3 VaR to window 2 VaR, for live and dead funds, respectively. The mean (median) for dead funds is 1.29 (1.14) for the ratios of window 2 VaR to window 1 VaR, and 1.35 (1.22) for the ratios of window 3 VaR to window 2 VaR. These ratios clearly show that the VaR of hedge funds, estimated using 60 monthly return observations, increases significantly in the two years prior to a fund's death. In fact, over those two years, just prior to a fund's death, the average increase in the VaR of the fund is 74%. VaR appears to be very effective in capturing the components of risk of hedge funds that lead to its death. Note that different funds die on different dates so that the rolling windows may contain different time periods for different dead funds.
In strong contrast, the corresponding mean (median) ratios for live funds are much lower at 1.09 Therefore, we conclude that the VaR based on EVT, as estimated in this paper, is an effective measure for capturing hedge fund risk. It can powerfully detect the increasing risk behavior for hedge funds towards their death date. In addition, the five-year rolling window approach effectively distinguishes the different risk patterns for live funds from those of dead funds.
Benchmarking hedge fund risk to the S&P 500 index
We use the S&P 500 index risk estimates to benchmark hedge fund risk. Our objective is to quantitatively assess, for the entire hedge fund industry, the risk of hedge funds when compared to a broad equity market index. Specifically, we wish to understand how the risk profile of each hedge fund compares to average market risk. The results are presented in Table 8 . The relative
VaR for the S&P index using monthly returns over five years is 13.4%. In contrast, the median relative VaR for the 906 live funds in our sample is 13.3%, as shown in Table 2 , which indicates that the risk of most live funds is comparable to the risk of an equivalent position in the S&P 500, which is a broad based US stock market index. The median relative VaR for the 380 dead funds (as shown in 
Conclusion
Over the last decade, especially since the LTCM debacle, hedge funds have been at the center of a debate between regulators and market participants, regarding the extent of regulation that the hedge fund industry should be subjected to. Regulators argue that hedge funds pose significant systemic risk in financial markets since they resort to excessive risk taking in the absence of regulation. Market participants have been arguing that though there may be some hedge funds that do operate in that manner, the vast majority of hedge funds operate within prudent solvency norms. Our paper examines the risk characteristics and capital adequacy of nearly thirteen hundred hedge funds, in order to understand whether the vast majority of hedge funds operate within prudent solvency norms or not.
Using Value-at-Risk based risk measures, we find that the vast majority hedge funds are adequately capitalized, with only a very small proportion (2.9%) of live funds being undercapitalized. This is in strong contrast to the case of LTCM, which held extremely risky positions, magnified by an abnormal 50:1 leverage ratio, thus putting the fund capital at significant risk.
Moreover, all the under-capitalized funds are relatively small, and constitute a very small fraction of the total net assets in the hedge fund industry. Hence the capital problems at LTCM are not indicative of the hedge fund industry as a whole.
We conduct extensive backtesting of our VaR estimation approach, and find that our VaR estimates based on Extreme Value Theory are able to forecast extreme returns in hedge funds fairly accurately. A number of tests show that our results and inferences are robust to small sample biases, and return frequency and estimation window issues. When we benchmark hedge fund risk to that of an equivalent position in the S&P 500 index, we find that most hedge funds have risk profiles comparable to that of the broad based equity index, thereby strengthening our conclusion that most hedge funds maintain reasonable levels of risk and are adequately capitalized.
Our study shows that using VaR based measures is superior to using traditional risk measures like standard deviation of returns and leverage ratios, in capturing hedge fund risk. Standard deviation based risk measures understate risk and are inappropriate for hedge funds, since hedge fund returns exhibit significantly high kurtosis. Leverage ratios do not effectively capture hedge fund risk, since they are just noisy indicators of credit risk to debt holders -they ignore the inherent riskiness of the assets portfolios completely. VaR, as estimated in this paper, is very effective in capturing the underlying risk trends in hedge fund returns that lead to a fund's death.
This is evidenced by a significant upward trend in VaR for dead funds starting two years before their death, while no such trend is observed for live funds. These results have fundamental implications for risk-adjusted performance measurement in the hedge fund industry.
Our study is the first one that extensively analyzes hedge fund risks and relates them to capital adequacy. The large extent of adequate capitalization in hedge funds that we find in this paper has strong implications for fund managers, institutional lenders, investors, and financial regulators. Our results suggest that, from the perspective of capital adequacy concerns, the market participants' arguments for letting the hedge fund industry operate with minimal regulation has more merit than the regulators' arguments for subjecting the hedge fund industry to stricter regulation. Cap=(E actual -E required )/E required (the Cap ratio) represents the degree of under-capitalization, where E required is the required equity that is 3 times the 99% 1-month VaR of the fund (using EVT), and E actual is the actual equity which is taken from the data. A Cap ratio less than zero implies that the actual equity is not sufficient to cover the risk of the portfolio as per the VaR approach. All figures are medians for each style. 
Figure 1 VaR Backtesting Results
This figure presents the plots of the number of violations at three confidence levels of VaR (90%, 95%, and 99%), for the 72 live funds and 25 dead funds with at least a 160-month return history. The backtesting results presented here are based on 100 trials for each fund. The expected number of violations for each fund is indicated by the solid horizontal line, while the dotted lines above and below the solid line represent the 95% confidence intervals for the number of violations, to determine whether the number of actual violations for a fund is significantly different from the predicted violations or not. 
Figure 2 Ratio of EVT to Empirical VaR
This figure presents the box plots of the ratio of EVT based VaR to the 99% VaR based on the empirical distribution of returns, for 365 live funds and 126 dead funds with monthly return data for at least 100 months. The plots show the median ratio, as well as the 5%, 25%, 75% and 95% quantiles of the distribution of the ratio. 
Figure 3 Ratio of Short-term to Long-term VaR
This figure presents the box plots of the ratio of 5-year VaR to 15+ year VaR based on EVT, for the 46 live and 18 dead funds that have more than 15 years of return data available. The plots show the median ratio, as well as the 5%, 25%, 75% and 95% quantiles of the distribution of the ratio. .4
Figure 4 Ratios of Successive Rolling Window VaRs
This figure presents box plots of the ratios of successive five-year rolling window VaRs for 538 live and 213 dead funds that have at least a seven-year return history available. Window 3, window 2, and window 1 refer to the five-year windows immediately preceding, one year prior, and two years prior respectively, to the fund death date (or June 2002 for live funds). Therefore, dead32 refers to the ratio of VaR in window 3 to that in window 2, for dead funds. The other ratios are defined similarly. The plots show the median ratio, as well as the 5%, 25%, 75% and 95% quantiles of the distribution of the ratio. 
